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ARTICLES
WHEN DID THE CONSTITUTION BECOME LAW?
Gary Lawson*
Guy Seidmant
Article VII of the United States Constitution declares that " It] he
Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for
the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying
the Same."' On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth
state to ratify the Constitution. Under the plain terms of Article VII,
that would seem to be enough to bring the Constitution into effect.
States that subsequently ratified the Constitution, with or without
knowledge of New Hampshire's decisive action,2 were electing to join
an already existing union.
One might assume thatJune 21 would therefore have gone down
in history as a national holiday: the day that the nation's governing
charter became law. Neither June 21 nor the New Hampshire ratify-
ing convention, however, has become part of the national folklore.
Nor are they even part of the specialized lore of the law. Indeed, ac-
cording to the standard legal account, the Constitution did not be-
come effective as law until March 4, 1789, when the first session of
Congress began. The Supreme Court so held in 1820 in Owings v.
* Professor, Boston University School of Law. We are grateful to Jack Beermann
and other participants at a workshop at Boston University School of Law for their
comments.
t Lecturer, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel.
1 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
2 Virginia ratified the Constitution on June 25, 1788 without definitively know-
ing about the events in New Hampshire. See 2 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, HISTORY OF
THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
578 (New York, Harpet & Bros. 1865).
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Speed,3 and that answer has endured as established hornbook
doctrine.4
The standard account is wrong, or at least incomplete. It is
wrong across a wide range of circumstances, including the specific cir-
cumstances at issue in Owings v. Speed. The truth about the Constitu-
tion's legal effect is far more complicated and nuanced than the
Supreme Court recognized in 1820, and it is long past time for that
ancient error to be corrected. Certain provisions of the Constitution,
in accordance with conventional doctrine, did not in fact become ef-
fective until the First Congress was in session, but other provisions be-
came law both earlier and later than that date. Provisions that require
the action of the President did not become effective until a President
had been properly elected and sworn into office on April 30, 1789.
Still, other provisions became legally operative as soon as the Article
VII ratification process was complete. Whether that latter date is June
21, 1788, when the ninth state ratified the document, orJuly 2, 1788,
when the Confederation Congress received notification of that ratifi-
cation, 5 or some subsequent date when the ratification was or should
have been verified by Congress, much of the Constitution became a
binding legal document at some point during the summer of 1788.
There are three reasons why it is important to know the true
date(s) of the Constitution's legal effectiveness. First, even in the
twenty-first century, it is not difficult to imagine cases in which the
effective date of the Constitution might prove dispositive. Indeed,
one such case, with enormously high stakes, occupied a great deal of
judicial attention in the 1980s. The Oneida Indian Nation sued in
1978 to recover five million acres of land in New York that it claimed
was purchased by the State of New York in 1788 through an invalid
3 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820).
4 See 16 Am. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 43 (1998) ("The Constitution of the
United States did not take effect at once on its being ratified by the necessary number
of conventions in nine states."); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 35 (1984) ("The Consti-
tution of the United States did not become operative until... a day for commencing
proceedings under the Constitution had been appointed by Congress."). The sparse
law review commentary that mentions the effective date of the Constitution also fol-
lows Owings without comment. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Uncon-
ventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 556 (1995); Hans W. Baade, "Original
Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1001, 1003 n.5
(1991); Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertemporal Law of Statutory
Construction and Constitutional lnterpretation, 43 AM.J. COMp. L. 319, 337 n.144 (1995).
5 34JouRNALs OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 281 (Roscoe R. Hill
ed., 1937).
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treaty.6 One of the plaintiff's many arguments was that the Constitu-
tion eliminated any power that the ratifying states might have had
under the Confederation government to enter into treaties with Indi-
ans, and that the 1788 treaty with New York was therefore illegal. 7
That claim was flatly dismissed by the courts on the strength of Owings
v. Speed's 1820 declaration that the Constitution did not become bind-
ing law until March 4, 1789.8 While the litigation, which spanned
more than ten years, involved a wide range of substantive, jurisdic-
tional, and procedural issues, 9 it is hard to say that Owings's holding
was entirely irrelevant to the outcome. Put more bluntly, had the ef-
fective date of the Constitution been correctly understood two de-
cades ago, a substantial portion of upstate New York might have
changed hands.
Second, some theories of governmental legitimacy might turn on
the precise sequence of events in the founding era, so it is important
that those events be properly recorded and understood. For instance,
Akhil Amar and Bruce Ackerman (along with his sometime-co-author
Neal Katyal) have engaged in an ongoing debate concerning the legal-
ity 6f the adoption of the Constitution.10 Part of that debate involves
the extent to which the Articles of Confederation, which clearly re-
quired unanimous consent among the states for any alterations, were
6 Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 520 F. Supp. 1278, 1284-85 (N.D.N.Y.
1981).
7 Id. at 1288.
8 See infra note 9.
9 In all, there were four decisions on the merits. See Oneida Indian Nation, 520 F.
Supp. at 1278, affd in part & rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982), on remand,
649 F. Supp. 420 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d. Cir. 1988) (Originally the
district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The circuit court then remanded the claim based on interpretation of the0
treaties and Articles of Confederation for an evidentiary heaing, but affirmed dismis-
sal of all other claims. On remand the district court dismissed the claim holding that
Congress did not have the authority under the Articles of Confederation'nor intent to
prohibit the state purchase of land. The circuit affirmed.). Additionally, there was a
passel of decisions on procedural issues. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 102
F.R.D. 450 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (disqualifying counsel), remanded, 757 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.
1985); Oneida Indian Nation v. NewYork, 102 F.R.D. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying
motion to intervene), rev'd, 732 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1984).
10 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41-44 (1991); 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 49-68 (1998); Ackerman &
Katyal, supra note 4, at 539-58; Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitu-
tional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 462-87 (1994); Akhil Reed
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1043, 1047-60 (1988).
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in effect during the founding period."1 As we shall later see, the exis-
tence of the Constitution did not necessarily preclude the continuing
validity of the Articles of Confederation, 12 so the effective date of the
Constitution does not definitively resolve the status of the Articles.
Nonetheless, the relationship between the Articles and the Constitu-
tion is relevant to some important debates about theories of interpre-
tation and legitimacy, and the effective date of the Constitution
potentially bears on that relationship.13
Third, purely as a matter of history, there is something to be said
for correcting the record. If history books had consistently reported
the year of the Norman Conquest as 1067 and we now discovered that
it actually happened in 1066,14 it probably would not change much of
consequence in the world, but one might as well get it right. This is
particularly true with something as basic as the effective date of the
Constitution.
In Part I of this Article, we set forth the correct understanding of
the Constitution's effective date. We show that the Supreme Court
grossly oversimplified the problem in 1820. Different clauses of the
Constitution actually became effective at different points in time, and
certain crucial provisions, especially those limiting the power of state
governments, took effect immediately upon completion of the ninth
ratification in 1788. In Part II, we show how that understanding might
have altered the course of the litigation in the 1980s between the State
of New York and the Oneida Indian Nation. We demonstrate that the
federal courts rejected the Oneida Indian Nation's claims to land in
New York on the basis of a 1788 treaty that was invalid under a proper
understanding of the Constitution's effective date. Part III contains
brief concluding remarks.
The legal operation of the Constitution, like its adoption, was an
ongoing process. That makes it difficult to fix a precise date for cele-
bration,1 5 but the logs of a potential national holiday is a small price to
pay for doctrinal and historical accuracy.
11 See Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 4, at 539-58.
12 See id. at 557.
13 We leave it to the combatants in those debates to determine whether and how
it does so.
14 It would appear that much of what we "know" about the Norman Conquest is
in fact error. See FRANK McLYNN, 1066: THE YEAR OF THE THREE BATTLES passim
(1999). But the date of October 14, 1066 for the Battle of Hastings has thus far sur-
vived the test of time.
15 Or for mourning, if one thinks that the Anti-Federalists had the better of the
argument.
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I. WHEN (AND WHOM) DiD TE CONSTITUTION BriND?
A. The Birth of a Nation-Or Was It Still a Pregnancy?
On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth state to rat-
ify the United States Constitution.' 6 The Confederation Congress re-
ceived official notification of New Hampshire's decisive ratification on
July 23 1788 and verified the official documents shortly thereafter.' 7
Pursuant to Article VII, that ninth ratification was "sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same."18
It was, however, well understood when the Constitution was pro-
posed for ratification that the document was not self-executing in all
respects. A Congress and a President had to be selected in accor-
dance with the procedures set forth in the new Constitution. The
states had to be notified of the final ratification and then had to con-
duct elections for the initial members of the House, Senate, and Elec-
toral College. There had to be a time and place established for the
first meeting of the new Congress. The electoral votes had to be cast
and counted, and the new President and Vice President sworn in.
Governmental officers had to be appointed. Thus, the new govern-
ment could not totally displace the government established under the
Articles of Confederation immediately upon the ninth ratification, be-
cause the new government did not yet exist. Provisions had to be
made for an orderly transition to the new constitutional regime.
The Constitutional Convention specifically requested that the
Confederation Congress provide such a transitional mechanism to ef-
fect a smooth transfer of power from the old to the new government.
The Convention's resolution of September 17, 1787 submitted the
Constitution to the Confederation Congress for transmittal to the
states for ratification' 9 and further asked the Congress to spell out
some procedural details in the event of successful ratification:
16 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HisroRY OF THE FiRsT FEDERAL ELECTIONS 1788-1790, at
24 (Merrill Jensen & Robert A. Becker eds., 1976) [hereinafter FIRST FEDERAL
ELEcTIONS].
17 We have been unable to locate the precise moment at which the Confedera-
tion Congress authenticated New Hampshire's ratification. OnJuly 2, 1788, the Con-
federation Congress referred the nine existing ratifications to a committee "to
examine the same." Id. at 29. On July 9, the Congressional Committee on Putting
the Constitution into Operation reported that nine states "have duly ratified the
aforesaid Constitution." Id. at 33.
18 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
19 See FrsT FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 16, at 6.
Resolved, That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United States
in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that it
2001]
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Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Convention, that as soon as
the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution,
the United States in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which
Electors should be appointed by the States which shall have ratified
the same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble to vote
for the President, and the Time and Place for commencing Pro-
ceedings under this Constitution.20
The Congress complied with the Convention's request on Sep-
tember 13, 1788 by resolving
[t] hat the first Wednesday in January next be the day for appointing
Electors in the several states, which before the said day shall have
ratified the said Constitution; that the first Wednesday in February
next be the day for the Electors to assemble in their respective
states, and vote for a President; and that the first Wednesday in
March next be the time, and the present seat of Congress the place
for commencing proceedings under the said Constitution.21
According to this resolution, the new Congress would commence its
operations in New York, the site of the Confederation Congress, on
March 4, 1789.
It is interesting and significant that the Framers did not write the
details of a transitional period into Article VII. The bare text of Arti-
cle VII says only that nine ratifications are sufficient "for the Establish-
ment of this Constitution."22  But the Convention and the
Confederation Congress were surely right that something more was
needed to create an operational government. The federal govern-
ment could not pass laws, appoint officials, or enter into treaties with-
out a Congress, Senate, and President. So was or was not the new
government "Establish [ed]" on June 21, 1788? Or did the effective-
ness of the Constitution await the entrance of the new Congress on
March 4, 1789, or even the swearing in of a new President on April 30,
1789?
should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in
each State by the People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legisla-
ture, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof to the United States in
Congress assembled.
Id. (quoting RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONVENTION SUBMITTING THE CONSTITUTION TO THE
CONFEDERATION CONCRESS (17 Sept. 1787)).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 131.
22 U.S. CONT. art. VII.
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B. The Supreme Court Speaks
The Supreme Court faced this problem squarely in 1820 in the
little-known case of Owings v. Speed.23 In 1785, the Commonwealth of
Virginia granted a patent for 1,000 acres of land to John C. Owings
and another landowner.24 On December 2, 1788, the Virginia legisla-
ture passed a statute vesting 100 acres of the Owings's tract in a set of
trustees for the establishment of a new town.25 Owings subsequently
brought an ejectment action against lessees of the town property,
claiming that the statute vesting the Owings's parcel in the trustees
violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution2 6 by impairing the
contract represented by the land patent.27 The Supreme Court, per
Chief Justice Marshall, held that the Constitution, and therefore the
Contracts Clause, was not operative in 1788 when the Virginia legisla-
ture passed the statute divesting Owings of his property.28 After re-
counting the actions of the Constitutional Convention and the
Confederation Congress concerning implementation of the new Con-
stitution,29 Marshall declared:
Both Governments [i.e., the old Confederation government and the
new constitutional government] could not be understood to exist at
the same time. The new Government did not commence until the
old Government expired. It is apparent that the Government did
not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth
State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose
continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who
were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose
of bringing the new government into operation. In fact, Congress
did continue to act as a government until it dissolved on the first of
November, by the successive disappearance of its members. It ex-
23 18 U.S. (6 Wheat.) o420 (1820).
24 Id. at 421.
25 Id.; see also Act of Dec. 2, 1788, 1788 Va. Acts ch. LX. The statute made refer-
ence to the tract vested in "John C. Owing." All of the records in the Supreme Court,
however, used the name "Owings." We assume in this Article (for no reason that we
can defend) that the lawyers in the case spelled Owings's name correctly.
26 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.").
27 See id. Owings could not, of course, raise any claims under the Federal Consti-
tution for the taking of property without just compensation, because there was no
provision in the original constitutional text barring stats takings of property.
28 See id. at 422-23.
29 Marshall's recounting left much to be desired. Marshall incorrectly fixed the
date of assembly of the First Congress as March 3, 1789; it was actually March 4. And
he dated the September 13, 1788 implementing resolution of the Confederation Con-
gress as "in September or October, 1788." Owings, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 422.
2001]
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isted potentially until the 2d of March, the day preceding that on
which the members of the new Congress were directed to
assemble.3 0
In fact, as Marshall acknowledged, because Article I, Section 7
makes presentment to the President a prerequisite for the enactment
of valid laws,31 the new government could not truly be fully operative
until a President was selected and sworn in,3 2 which would make the
effective date of the new constitutional government April 30, 1789.
But whether one views March 4, 1789 or April 30, 1789 as the magic
moment for the effectiveness of the Constitution, the Virginia statute
of December 2, 1788 was enacted before the Constitution took effect,
and Owings therefore lost. So, at least, the Court held.
It is virtually certain that Owings was wrongly decided. But deter-
mining precisely in what respect Owings was wrong proves to be a
complicated task.
C. A Multi-Tiered Theory of Constitutional Effectiveness
An originalist might be tempted to say that if the Framers meant
to delay the effective date of the new government beyond the moment
of the ninth ratification, they could (and should) have said so in the
text of the Constitution instead of issuing resolutions from the Con-
vention on the side. If the Constitution does not take effect immedi-
ately upon ratification, this argument runs, then what sense does it
make to say, in Article VII, that the Constitution is "Establish [ed]" by
the necessary ratifications? The only question, on this view, is when
"Ratification" of the Constitution pursuant to Article VII took place.
Was it when the ninth state completed its vote, when that ninth vote
was received (or certified) by the Confederation Congress, or possibly
even when notice of that certification was given to the state govern-
ments? In any event, on this analysis the Constitution must have gone
into effect sometime in June or July 1788.
On the other hand, one could equally say, in agreement with
Chief Justice Marshall, that the Framers did not need to state the obvi-
ous: the Constitution, even once ratified, was not self-executing. As
Marshall noted, and as the Convention recognized, the machinery of
governance had to be put into place before the new national govern-
ment could function. 33 And rather than constitutionalize the specific
dates of transition, the Convention left it to the Confederation Con-
30 Id.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
32 See Owings, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 422-23.
33 See id.
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gress to determine the transitional timetable. One could argue that
just as treaties between nations are not necessarily self-executing, and
thus do not necessarily create enforceable rights and obligations sim-
ply by virtue of their formal ratification,3 4 so the Constitution, a
"treaty" of sorts among states and people, did not create legal rights
and obligations simply by virtue of formal ratification. Furthermore,
one might continue, this position does not render the term "Establish-
ment" in Article VII meaningless. Once the necessary nine ratifica-
tions were made, no state could then undo what had already been
done: the Constitution was now "in place," awaiting only its full imple-
mentation. Before the ninth ratification took place, presumably any
ratifying state could undo its ratification.3 5 The "Establishment" of
the Constitution under Article VII, however, took away that freedom
and made the Constitution part of the legal landscape, even if that
landscape continued to include the Articles of Confederation as well
until the machinery of the new government was fully (for want of a
better term) established.
Both of these positions are partially right but seriously wrong.
Each assumes, as did Marshall in Owings, that the Constitution must
be operative or not as a whole. Perhaps, however, the Constitution
becomes operative in stages, so that different portions of the docu-
ment create rights and obligations at different points in time. For
instance, one could say that the provisions of the Constitution that
require legislative and presidential action-and this includes some of
the most important provisions-could not be fully "in effect" until all
of the executory steps necessary for its establishment had taken place.
The national government could not pass laws, make treaties, or ap-
point officers until the Congress and the President were, both for-
mally and functionally, in office. These provisions thus did not
become legally operative until April 30, 1789.36 Other provisions that
require only unilateral congressional action might, on this argument,
34 See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955 passim (1999) [hereinafter Yoo,
Globalism]; John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense
of Non-Self-Execution, 99 CoLuM. L. REv. 2218 passim (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties
and Public Lawmaking].
35 Cf Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V. The Constitutional Les-
sons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YA.E LJ. 677, 683 (1993) (arguing that Con-
gress and the States may revoke proposals or ratifications of constitutional
amendments until, but not after, the necessary three-quarters of the States have
ratified).
36 HERBERT APTHEEER, EARLY YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: FROM THE END OF THE
REVOLUTION TO THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF WASHINGTON (1783-1793), at 106
(1976).
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have become effective on March 4, 1789; 37 these provisions would in-
clude such matters as the selection of legislative officers,38 the estab-
lishment of legislative procedures,39 and the discipline of members of
Congress. 40 Still other provisions, however, do not require any legisla-
tive or executive machinery to make them operative. These provisions
could meaningfully be "in effect" at some earlier time, such as the
moment of ratification. The Contracts Clause appears to be precisely
the kind of provision that is self-executing in this respect. No federal
legislative or presidential action is needed in order to implement its
prohibition on certain kinds of state laws. The Supremacy Clause en-
sures that state courts must give legal effect to the Contracts Clause
even if no federal judges are in office. 41 Indeed, the Constitution's
few prohibitions on states were presumably designed to prevent major
evils (in order to justify the extraordinary step of limiting the powers
of states), so this is a context in which the norm might be thought to
operate at the soonest possible time. One could therefore agree with
Marshall that some of the Constitution's provisions did not take effect
until March or April 1789, but still maintain that Owings should have
won his case because the Contracts Clause was effective upon
ratification.
This "multi-tiered" theory of constitutional effectiveness must be
correct for a host of reasons involving the implementation of the new
Constitution and the founding generation's understanding of analo-
gous legal documents.
1. Lessons from the Founding
Go back to the actions of the Convention and the Confederation
Congress in implementing the new Constitution. Many of the formali-
ties necessary to carry the Constitution into effect were directly speci-
fied in the text of the Constitution. The Constitution itself prescribed
the qualifications for electors for the House and Senate,42 and the
37 Id.
38 The Constitution empowers the House to "chuse [sic] their Speaker and other
Officers." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. The Vice President is declared to be the Presi-
dent of the Senate. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. But the Senate is empowered to "chuse
[sic] their other Officers." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
39 See id. art. I, § 5, cls. 2-3 (empowering each House to determine its rules of
proceeding and to keep ajournal).
40 See id. art. I, § 5, cls. 1-2 (empowering each House to discipline, expel, and
determine the qualifications of its members).
41 See id. art. VI, cl. 2.
42 For the House, "the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requi-
site for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature," Id. art. I, § 2,
[VOL- 77:1
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states were empowered to set their own times and places for congres-
sional elections.43 Thus, the states could provide entirely for the elec-
tion of members of the new Congress without any help from the
Confederation Congress. Accordingly, the Convention did. not re-
quest, and the Confederation Congress did not provide, any machin-
ery for implementing the constitutional directives on congressional
elections.
There were two important matters, however, in which the inter-
vention of the Confederation Congress was necessary. First, the Con-
stitution specifically provided that the date for the meeting of the
Electoral College "shall be the same throughout the United States,"44
but did not fix a specific date (such as, for example, "six months after
ratification"). Perhaps it would have been possible for the states to
agree among themselves on a uniform date for the presidential elec-
tion through some vehicle other than the Confederation Congress,
but the preexisting Congress was the obvious locus for that choice.
Second, the Constitution did not specify a location for the new gov-
ernment in the interim period before a seat of government could be
established under the District Clause.45 Accordingly, the sole subjects
on which the Convention sought action by Congress concerned the
selection of presidential electors (and the subsequent counting of
electoral votes) and the specification of a location for the first meet-
ing of the new government.46 And the sole subjects on which the Con-
cl. 1, and the Senators from each state were (until the Seventeenth Amendment)
"chosen by the Legislature thereof." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
43 See id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.").
44 Id. art. II, § 4. The full sentence reads: "The Congress may determine the
Time of chusing [sic] the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes,
which Day shall be the same throughout the United States." Id.
45 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving Congress power "[tlo exercise exclusive Legisla-
tion in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as
may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the
Seat of the Government of the United States").
46 The full text of the relevant Convention resolution read:
Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the Con-
ventions of nine States, shall have ratified this Constitution, the United
States in Congress assembled should fix a day on which Electors should be
appointed by the States which shall have ratified the same, and a day on
which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the Time
and Place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution. That after
such Publication the Electors should be appointed, and the Senators and
Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for
2001]
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gress legislated for the operation of the new government concerned
presidential elections and the selection of a site for the government.
The critical assumption underlying this whole procedure was that
the constitutional provisions that did not require any federal legislative (or
executive) action were fully effective from the moment of ratification (however
that is ultimately defined). The provisions concerning the mecha-
nisms for electing members of Congress and presidential electors
were assumed by everyone to be in full force. As illustrated above, this
was the unchallenged, operative assumption of the Convention and
the Confederation Congress. There was substantial debate in the
Confederation Congress about the proper location of the seat of gov-
ernment, 47 but none at all concerning whether the Congress should,
for example, specify a mode of selecting presidential electors; every-
one understood that the selection of electors (though not the time of
their meeting) was left to the states by the now-operative Constitu-
tion.48 This was also the unchallenged assumption in the states follow-
ing ratification of the Constitution. For example, on September 27,
1788, Governor Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina issued a procla-
mation in the wake of the election ordinance of the Confederation
Congress. 49 After reciting the text of that ordinance, Governor Pinck-
ney declared:
And whereas the times, places and manner of holding elections for
senators and representatives under the constitution of the United States
are to be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof I do therefore
issue this proclamation giving authentic information of the above
act of Congress as an additional inducement to the punctual attend-
ance of the members of the legislature on the seventh day of Octo-
ber next being the day to which they stand adjourned. 50
the Election of the President, and should transmit their votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of
the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representa-
tives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; that the Senators
should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole purpose of receiving,
opening and counting the Votes for President; and, that after he shall be
chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay,
proceed to execute this Constitution.
FIRsT FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 16, at 6-7.
47 See generally id. at 23-143 (providing letters, journals, and newspaper articles
surrounding issues relating to the adoption of the Constitution).
48 See generally id. (detailing the debates concerning the Confederation Con-
gress's election ordinance of Sept. 13, 1788).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
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This clearly assumes that the Constitution's provisions concern-
ing the staffing of the new government were in full effect long before
March 4, 1789. We know of nothing in any state's proceedings during
the founding period that called this assumption into question. Ac-
cordingly, the evidence is overwhelming that at least some parts of the
Constitution-those which did not require implementation by the
new federal legislature and executive-were in effect immediately
upon ratification.
2. Lessons from the Law
This view of immediate legal operation of (at least part of) the
Constitution is consistent with general eighteenth-century norms con-
cerning the effective date of governmental instruments. There were
three kinds of public governmental instruments with which the fram-
ing generation was familiar: treaties, state constitutions, and statutes.5 '
All three kinds of instruments were clearly understood presumptively
to operate from their moment of effectiveness. Just as importantly, all
three kinds of instruments were understood to be capable of taking
effect in stages, with different provisions generating legal effects at
different times.
a. Treaties
Treaties have long been understood to operate from the moment
of their ratification.5 2 The Supreme Court expressed the correct
founding-era rule in 1850 when it observed,
In the construction of treaties, the same rules which govern other
compacts properly apply. They must be considered as binding from
the period of their execution; their operation must be understood
to take effect from that period, unless it shall, by some condition or
stipulation in the compact itself, be postponed.53
51 Governments execute many other kinds of instruments, such as licenses, char-
ters, land patents, and contracts, but they pertain more to private than to public law.
In any event, all of these instruments are also effective from the moment of issuance
(though one can argue about precisely what events are necessary for "issuance"-as in
the case, to pick a random example, of a commission of appointment to a govern-
ment post). Indeed, we have been unable to think of an instrument that is not pre-
sumptively effective from the moment of execution.
52 This does not mean that all treaties are necessarily self-executing. See sources
cited supra note 34. But to the extent that treaties have independent legal force, that
force radiates from the moment of ratification.
53 United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127, 148 (1850).
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This rule of immediate effectiveness is graphically illustrated by
the traditional practices of nations concerning such matters as the ter-
mination of war.54 Suppose that two governments complete all of the
necessary formalities for ratification of a treaty of peace. Peace cannot
be an effective reality until the troops engaged in combat are in-
formed of the treaty's ratification and lay down their arms. In a pre-
modern era without near-instantaneous forms of communication, the
process of notification to the belligerent forces could take weeks or
months. If the ratification of the treaty truly "ends" the war for legal
purposes, then those belligerent forces are engaged in (at the very
least) tortious acts if they continue fighting, even if they have no
means of knowing that the war is over. Despite this somewhatjarring
consequence, international law traditionally deemed the treaty effec-
tive immediately upon ratification. The drafters of the treaty were left
to deal with the potential liability of unwitting combatants once the
war ended. As we have elsewhere written:
A well-drafted treaty will include realistic timetables for notification
and withdrawal of troops and will contain provisions for immuniz-
ing the soldiers and their governments from liability for damage
inflicted before news of the peace can reach them; perhaps it will
also contain provisions for compensation to the citizens and govern-
ments that suffer such damage. The end of the "war," in the ex-
tended sense that includes the post-treaty period of transition, will
thus normally be determined by reference to the treaty.55
This scheme assumes that treaties take legal effect immediately upon
ratification. If the contracting states want to delay the legal effective-
ness of some portion of the treaty, they need to say so.
It is commonplace, however, for different parts of the treaty to
take effect at different times. In treaties that end a war of occupation,
for instance, the provisions that transfer sovereignty to the conqueror
can take effect immediately,56 while provisions that deal with the end-
ing of actual hostilities, the notification to combatting troops of the
war's end, and the withdrawal of troops from the transferred territory
54 The ensuing discussion is drawn from a number of sources, including T. BATY
&J. H. MORGAN, WAR: ITS CONDUCT AND LEGAL RESULTS 398 (1915), WiLuAM EDWARD
HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 482-95 (J.B. Atlay ed., Oxford 5th ed. 1904), and CoLEMAN
PHILLIPSON, TERMINATION OF WAR AND TREATIES OF PEACE 185-98, 214-17 (1916).
55 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Au-
thority, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 581, 605 (2001).
56 We have elsewhere discussed at some length how treaties that transfer control
or sovereignty of territory from one nation to another generally take effect immedi-
ately upon completion of the necessary ratifications. See id. at 604-07.
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might take place on a very different schedule. All parts of the instru-
ment need not take effect at the same time.
For an illustration, one needs to look no further than the Jay
Treaty of 179457 that formalized the peace between the United States
and Great Britain.58 The vast bulk of the Treaty, involving matters
such as borders, navigation, property, and trade, was obviously de-
signed to go into immediate operation, but Article II specified a
delayed timetable for the withdrawal of British troops:
His Majesty will withdraw all his troops and garrisons from all posts
and places within the boundary lines assigned by the treaty of peace
to the United States. This evacuation shall take place on or before
the first day of June, one thousand seveh hundred and ninety-six,
and all the proper measures shall in the interval be taken by concert
between the Government of the United States and His Majesty's
Governor-General in America, for settling the previous arrange-
ments which may be necessary respecting the delivery of the said
posts .... 9
In sum, treaties operate from the moment of their ratification unless
the treaty itself provides a different effective date, and different provi-
sions of the treaty can take effect at different points in time.
b. State Constitutions
Another useful analogue to the Federal Constitution is the im-
pressive set of state constitutions that was already in place in 1787.
These documents were in large measure models for the drafting of
the Federal Constitution and formed an essential part of the legal
background against which the Constitution was written and ratified.60
"Many at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 had assisted in the
writing of state constitutions." 61
We do not want to make too much of what is found in these state
constitutions. The early models, in particular, were experiments in
drafting that explored a fair amount of uncharted territory. The
drafters and ratifiers of these constitutions did not always have a clear
57 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art.
II, 8 Stat. 116.
58 For a similar analysis of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that terminated the
Mexican-American War, see Lawson and Seidman, supra note 55, at 605-06.
59 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, supra note 57, art. If, 8 Stat. at
117.
60 See DONALD S. LuTz, Ti ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONsrT -TONALISM 2 (1988)
(noting that state constitutions are "[r] eferred to directly or by implication more than
fifty times in forty-two sections of the U.S. Constitution").
61 Id. at 12.
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picture of what they were doing, or even of what they were trying to
do, and they certainly did. not have the luxury of long reflection on
deep questions of political theory. Nonetheless, much of what hap-
pened with these state constitutions confirms the basic propositions
about legal effectiveness gleaned from a study of treaties.
The drafters of state constitutions prior to and contemporaneous
with the adoption of the Federal Constitution were keenly aware of
the baseline rule of immediate legal effectiveness, and they often took
great care to accommodate that principle when making provision for
a transfer of power from one government to the next. The most di-
rect solution was provided by the Georgia Constitution of 1789, which
declared that "[t] his constitution shall take effect, and be in full force,
on the first Monday in October next, after the adoption of the
same .... "62 By specifically delaying the effective date of operation of
the constitution, the Georgia drafters evidently recognized that in the
absence of any such provision, the constitution would take immediate
effect. The delay in operation permitted the existing institutions to
continue until the new government was in place.
We admit that this interpretation of the Georgia Constitution is
not inevitable. It is possible that the specified date was understood to
replace some different date that would otherwise govern, such as
"whenever it is reasonable for the pre-existing institutions to termi-
nate." That is, perhaps the specified date was designed to advance
rather than delay the effective date of the Georgia Constitution by
mandating that the new institutions appear at a set time. In order for
this to be a plausible hypothesis, however, one must identify the back-
ground rule, other than immediate effectiveness, that the Georgia
Constitution was displacing. It is possible to invent such rules (as we
have done in this paragraph), but we are aware of nothing that would
single out any such rule as a good candidate. The only background
rule that had any currency, and therefore the only background rule
that the constitution's drafters might reasonably seek to avoid, was the
rule of immediate effectiveness.
North Carolina had a similarly direct solution to the problem of
transition. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 stated, in a brief
coda following the last numbered article, that "[this Constitution is
not intended to preclude the present Congress [operating under the
colonial charter] from making a temporary provision, for the well or-
dering of this State, until the General Assembly shall establish a gov-
ernment, agreeable to the mode herein before described." 63 Again,
62 GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 8.
63 N.C. CONsr. of 1776, coda.
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the clear underlying assumption is that the constitution takes effect
immediately upon adoption unless the document states otherwise. In-
stead of specifying a particular date of operation, as did the Georgia.
Constitution of 1789, the North Carolina drafters gave authority to the
preexisting government to implement the transition. Thus, the effec-
tive date of the constitution was not strictly delayed; the constitution
simply empowered existing institutions to continue in effect for some
time. The distinction is important, because those provisions that did
not require any period of transition, such as the Bill of Rights, were
presumably operative from the moment of adoption. 64 That is the
difference between the Georgia approach, which straightforwardly de-
lays the effectiveness of the constitution, and the North Carolina ap-
proach, which allows the constitution to take immediate effect but
provides for transitional mechanisms.
Georgia, as far as we can tell, was the only state that flatly delayed
the effective date of its constitution. The other states all provided
some kind of transitional device. One common approach was to make
express provision for the continuance in office of existing public offi-
cials until the machinery of their new governments was operative. For
instance, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided:
To the end there may be no failure ofjustice, or danger arise to the
commonwealth from a change of the form of government, all of-
ficers, civil and military, holding commissions under the govern-
ment and people of Massachusetts Bay in New England, and all
other officers of the said government and people, at the time this
constitution shall take effect, shall have, hold, use, exercise, and en-
joy, all the powers and authority to them granted or committed,
until other persons shall be appointed in their stead; and all courts
of law shall proceed in the execution of the business of their respec-
tive departments; and all the executive and legislative officers, bod-
ies, and powers shall continue in full force, in the enjoyment and
exercise of all their trusts, employments, and authority; until the
general court, and the supreme and executive officers under this
constitution, are designated and invested with their respective
trusts, powers, and authority.65
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 similarly provided:
To the end that there may be no failure ofjustice or danger arise to
this state from a change in the form of government, all civil and
military officers, holding commissions under the government and
people of New Hampshire, and other officers of the said govern-
64 We have to say "presumably," because we have not been able to find a case, in
any of the original states, that squarely presents the point.
65 MAss. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. VI, art. IX.
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ment and people, at the time this constitution shall take effect, shall
hold, exercise and enjoy all the powers and authorities to them
granted and committed, until other persons shall be appointed in
their stead.66
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 contained elaborate provi-
sions for the continuation in office of the existing authorities:
That no inconvenience may arise from the alterations and amend-
ments in the constitution of this commonwealth, and in order to
carry the same into complete operation, it is hereby declared and
ordained:
That the president and supreme executive council shall continue to
exercise the executive authority of this commonwealth, as hereto-
fore, until the third Tuesday of December next; but no intermedi-
ate vacancies in the council shall be supplied by new elections.
That all officers in the appointment of the executive department
shall continue in the exercise of the duties of their respective offices
until the first day of September, one thousand seven hundred and
ninety-one, unless their commissions shall sooner expire by their
own limitations, or the said offices become vacant by death or resig-
nation, and no longer, unless reappointed and commissioned by
the governor; except that the judges of the supreme court shall
hold their offices for the terms in their commissions respectively
expressed.
That justice shall be administered in the several counties of the
State, until the period aforesaid, by the same justices, in the same
courts, and in the same manner as heretofore. 67
The Delaware Constitution of 1776,68 the South Carolina Consti-
tution of 1778,69 and the Virginia Constitution of 177670 also expressly
provided for the continuation in office of various officials until elec-
tions were held under the new constitutions. All of these provisions
made sense only on the assumption that preexisting governmental in-
stitutions had authority only to the extent that such authority was recognized
by the new constitutions. And that, in turn, assumes that the new consti-
tutions were, to the extent possible, operative from the moment of
their adoption.
As in the case of North Carolina, this approach of "granting a
continuance" to preexisting institutions presumably has the effect of
66 N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II, para. 17.
67 PA. CoNsT. of 1790, sched. §§ 2-4.
68 DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 27.
69 S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. II.
70 VA. CONST. of 1776, paras. 11, 14.
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allowing provisions that do not require transitional mechanisms, such
as bills of rights and selection procedures for the new government, to
take effect immediately.71 Other provisions that require action by offi-
cials under the new government cannot, of course, take effect until
those officials are in place. Thus, the notion of a constitution that
becomes operative in stages was familiar, at least in structure, from the
models of state constitutions that were available in the late eighteenth
century.
A number of states expressly recognized that preexisting laws had
to be in some sense ratified by the new constitutions. A good illustra-
tion is article XXI of the New Jersey Constitution of 1776:
[A]ll the laws of this Province... shall be and remain in full Force,
until altered by the Legislature of this Colony (such only excepted
as are incompatible with this Charter) and shall be, according as
heretofore, regarded in all Respects by all civil Officers, and others,
the good People of this Province.7 2 .
Not only does this provision reflect the view that the old laws would
expire unless reaffirmed by the new constitution, but the clause stat-
ing that laws "incompatible with this Charter" do not survive again
shows how the document was understood to operate from the mo-
meht of its adoption.
In states like New Jersey that did not expressly provide for the
continuation in office of pre-constitutional authorities, did the rule of
immediate operation instantaneously wipe out the existing govern-
mental authorities, even before the new institutions were in place?
The answer is obviously no, and it can be reached through several
lines of reasoning. First, one coild say that a reference to "all the
laws" that remain in effect under the new constitution includes laws
concerning governmental structure. Those laws would thus continue
in effect until displaced by action of the existing authorities pursuant
to the new constitution. Second, one could say that the continuation
of the existing authorities was implicit in the new constitution, even
71 As noted above, see supra note 50, we must base this conclusion on inference
rather than authority.
72 NJ. CONST. of 1776, art. XXI; see also MASS. CONST. of 1780, part II, ch. VI, art.
VI ("All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used and approved in the
province, colony or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practiced on in the courts
of law, shall remain and be in full force:"); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV (stating
that English common and statutory law, as well as acts of the New York colonial legis-
lature through April 19, 1775 "shall be and continue the law of this State"); S.C.
CONST. of 1776, art. XXIX ("The resolutions of this or any former congress of this
colony, and all laws now of force here, (and not hereby altered,) shall so continue
until altered or repealed.").
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without an express provision preserving their authority. Obviously, an
express provision would be preferable, as some of these states ulti-
mately realized, 73 but it would not be bizarre to say that the new con-
stitution implicitly retained the existing governmental institutions
until their replacements had taken office. But under any of these un-
derstandings, some parts of the constitutions became immediately ef-
fective, while others had to await the transition to the new regime to
become fully effective.
To be fair, not every early state constitution demonstrated the
same level of care about the details of transition. The New Hampshire
Constitution of 1784, as noted, paid acute attention to these matters,
but the New Hampshire Constitution of 1776 said only that the ex-
isting legislators "assume the Name, Power and Authority of a House
of Representatives or Assembly." 74 The 1789 Georgia Constitution
specified an effective date for the instrument, but the 1777 state con-
stitution merely set a date for the election of legislators and county
officers.7 5 And while the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 had one
of the most complete transition schedules to be found in any early
constitution, the state's 1776 constitution merely maintained the ex-
isting legislature by implication. 76 Nonetheless, the overwhelming
message from the state constitutions, and particularly from the consti-
tutions that were framed after the intial wave of adoptions in 1776 and
1777,77 is that eighteenth-century constitution-makers were keenly
aware that such documents took effect upon adoption. One can fairly
say that by 1789, it was the clear understanding in the states that con-
stitutions presumptively take effect immediately upon their adop-
tion.78 It was just as clear that constitutions could take effect in stages:
73 See, e.g., N.J. CONsT. of 1844, art. X; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. II.
74 N.H. CONST. of 1776, pt. 3.
75 GA, CONST. of 1777, arts. II, LIII.
76 See PA. CONST. of 1776, Plan or Frame of Government for the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania § 9 ("The members of the house of representatives shall be chosen annually
by ballot, by the freemen of the commonwealth, on the second Tuesday in October
forever, (except this present year)."). The 1777 Vermont Constitution followed the
Pennsylvania model in this respect, as it did in many others. See VER. CONST. of 1777,
Plan or Frame of Government § VIII.
77 On the different stages, or "waves," of state constitutional development, see
LuTz, supra note 60, at 103-04.
78 This understanding did not disappear. Twentieth-century drafters were, if any-
thing, even more acutely aware of the need for constitutions to provide specifically for
transitional mechanisms because of the presumptive rule of immediate effectiveness.
See COMM. ON STATE GOV'T, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 21-22, 51-52 (5th ed. 1948)
(recommending, and explaining the need for, a transitional schedule in new
constitutions).
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some provisions could take effect at once, while others awaited transi-
tional action by the preexisting authorities.
c. Statutes
The same rule concerning effectiveness applies to statutes. It has
long been settled that statutes take effect on the day of their enact-
ment unless the statute itself specifies a different time.79 The First
Congress under the Constitution evidently shared this view. That
Congress knew how to prescribe an effective date later than the date
of enactment: the second statute of the First Congress, which imposed
various customs duties, delayed the effective date of the tariffs by peri-
ods ranging from four weeks to sixteen months.80 Significantly, the
Congress had no problem with the idea that different parts of the
statute would take effect at different times, as reflected in the (widely)
differential periods of delay for different tariffs.
The government's other early statutes, however, including the
federal government's first major criminal enactment containing such
matters as a provision imposing the death penalty for counterfeiting
federal securities,81 specified no effective date, meaning that the legis-
lature must have intended the date of enactment to serve as the effec-
tive date.
But could the government really have meant this? Suppose that
on April 30, 1790, the federal legislature enacts a criminal statute pre-
scribing the death penalty for knowingly passing counterfeit federal
securities. On May 1, 1790, a person in Georgia commits an act that
falls within the terms of the statute. The conduct occurs after enact-
ment of the statute, but there is no way in 1790 that news of the enact-
ment could have reached every recess of Georgia by the next day. It
was therefore metaphysically impossible for the defendant to have
learned of the statute before committing the acts. Can that person
lawfully be sent to the gallows?8 2
Although it may jar modern sensibilities, the answer-or at least
the eighteenth-century answer-is almost surely yes. The Constitu-
79 SeeArnold v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 104, 119 (1815); LaFontant v.
INS, 135 F.3d 158, 160-61 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
80 Act ofJuly 4, 1789, ch. II, § 1, 1 Stat. 24, 24 (making most duties effective "from
and after the first day of August next ensuing"); id. ch. II, § 2, 1 Stat. at 26 (duties on
hemp imposed "from and after the first day of December, which shall be in the year
one thousand seven hundred and ninety").
81 SeeAct of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. IX, § 14, 1 Stat. 112, 115.
82 Lest there be any doubt, the statute prescribed that "the manner of inflicting
the punishment of death, shall be by hanging the person convicted by the neck until
dead." Id. ch. IX, § 33, 1 Stat. at 119.
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tion does exhibit a measure of concern for notice of the law. The
Constitution flatly prohibits either the states or the federal govern-
ment from passing ex post facto laws 8 3-that is, laws that punish con-
duct that was legal at the time that the conduct occurred. But that
goes only to the problem of retroactive criminalization.8 4 It does not
reach the problem of communication: the necessity of a time lag be-
tween enactment of a law and its promulgation to the affected public.
It is quite clear that the ex post facto clauses do not address this latter
issue. State constitutions prior to 1789 often contained provisions
prohibiting ex post facto laws, and those provisions uniformly and ex-
pressly referred only to statutes that sought to punish conduct that
took place before the statutes came into existence.8 5 A law does not
become "ex post facto" simply because one does not, and cannot, have
knowledge of its enactment.
Nor do notions of due process impose a constitutional "waiting
period" on the effectiveness of statutes.8 6 As noted above, the clear
tradition, reflected in early statutory and decisional law, treated imme-
diate effectiveness of even criminal laws as the accepted, and accept-
able, norm. The English practice was even harsher. Until an
enactment of 1793 made the date of the King's assent to a statute the
standard commencement date for the statute's operation, the rule was
that statutes were deemed to relate back to the first day of the session
in which they were passed.8 7 The American prohibition against ex
post facto laws neatly dealt with the retroactivity problems inherent in
this scheme, but the British and American practices-and the narrow
response to the practices reflected in the various ex post facto
clauses-argue very strongly against the existence of any kind of tradi-
83 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
84 It has long been held that the ex post facto clauses apply only to criminal laws.
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91 (1798) (ChaseJ.); id. at 396-97 (Pater-
son, J., concurring); id. at 399-400 (Iredell, J., concurring). We accept that conclu-
sion here without seriously engaging it.
85 See id. at 396-97 (Paterson, J., concurring).
86 We say "notions of due process" to accommodate the fact that due process
constraints applied to federal legislative action before ratification of the Fifth Amend-
ment in 1791. The requirement in the sweeping clause, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
18, that executory laws be "necessary and proper" contains the substance of most of
what was codified in the Bill of Rights in 1791. See Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an
Exclamation Point, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 513-14 (1999).
87 See 44 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 567 (R. Peter Moore ed., 4th ed. 1983);
HENRI LEVY-ULLMANN, THE ENGLISH LEGAL TRADITION: ITS SOURCES AND HISTORY
243-44 (1935).
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tion of post-enactment notice that could form the foundation for a
due process challenge.88
Accordingly, the general rule for the legal effectiveness of statutes
in the late eighteenth century was quite clear: statutes were deemed
operative from the moment that they came into existence unless the
provisions themselves contained a different effective date.
d. The Constitution
Thus, with respect to every major governmental instrument that
was available as a model in the late eighteenth century, the rule re-
specting effectiveness was the same: such instruments take effect from
the moment of their adoption unless there is some provision that says
otherwise. 9 And where provisions say otherwise, the delay in effec-
tiveness can be partial. Legal instruments need not be effective or
ineffective in total at any particular moment in time.
Nothing in the Constitution categorically delays its effectiveness.
On the contrary, Article VII strongly indicates that ratification (adop-
tion) is enough for the "Establishment" of the Constitution.90 So why
doesn't that mean that the whole document took effect immediately
in the summer of 1788? The simple answer is that some provisions
were incapable of taking effect immediately because they required ac-
tion by governmental actors who did not yet exist. Although the Con-
stitution could have expressly provided for a transitional period, as
did many of the contemporaneous state constitutions, its failure to do
so poses no great problem for originalist textualists. Even the most
ardent textualist (and at least one of the present authors fits that
description quite nicely) will agree that inferences from a document's
structure and context are permissible interpretative tools. If it is obvi-
ous on the face of a legal instrument that its effective date, or the
effective date of at least part of the instrument, must be at some point
in the future, one should give effect to that obvious meaning. It is
clear that the Constitution, even without saying so expressly, contem-
plates that its provisions for legislative and executive action do not
take effect until appropriate steps have been taken to put the new
government into'place. This also means that the preexisting authori-
88 Needless to say, we are talking about the original meaning of due process limi-
tations. A litigant today in the position of our hypothetical 1790 counterfeiter might
well have a very strong claim under modem assumptions about due process.
89 Finally, one should note that judicial orders-another form of governmental
instrument-are enforceable when they are issued, unless the court or legislature in
some fashion stays the mandate.
90 See U.S. CoNsr. art. VII ("Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall
be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution.").
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ties, such as the institutions created by the Articles of Confederation,
were not immediately displaced by ratification of the new Constitu-
tion. The machinery of the old regime could continue until the ma-
chinery of the new regime was in place.
But those considerations apply only to the parts of the Constitu-
tion that, by necessary inference, carry an implied effective date that
goes beyond the moment of ratification. Provisions that are emi-
nently capable of taking effect upon ratification, such as the selection
provisions for members of Congress and presidential electors and the
Article I, Section 10 restraints on state power, such as the Contracts
Clause, do take effect immediately. An implication from necessity
only goes as far as the necessity requires.
There remains only the task of determining when the Constitu-
tion was ratified and when its self-executing provisions immediately
took effect. Although it is possible to argue that a "Ratification" is not
really a "Ratification" until it has been verified by some official author-
ity, the straightforward answer appears to be the correct one: the Con-
stitution was properly ratified when the necessary ninth state
convention completed its work, which in this case was 1:00 p.m. on
June 21, 1788. All subsequent events, such as notification to Congress
and the other states and verification by Congress of the authenticity of
the ratifying documents, merely communicate or give evidence of the
relevant event. Just as a statute or treaty binds even those who do not
(and cannot) know about its adoption, the ninth ratification of the
Constitution was legally effective without regard to the extent to which
that adoption was communicated to the world. The Contracts Clause
of the Constitution, and all other provisions that were capable of tak-
ing effect upon adoption of the Constitution, became effective on
June 21, 1788. When Chief Justice Marshall said otherwise, he was
simply wrong.
3. Lessons from the Founders?
Our argument thus far is based on the straightforward text of Ar-
ticle VII and inferences from the founding era's treatment of similar
legal instruments. What about direct evidence of the original under-
standing of the effect of New Hampshire's ratification? What did peo-
ple say about the legal effectiveness of the Constitution in the summer
of 1788? Didn't the Virginia legislature, for instance, make a very
powerful statement when it passed a law divesting Owings of his land
after Virginia had ratified the Constitution?
There are two kinds of answers to these obvious queries: interpre-
tative and substantive. The interpretative answer threatens to take us
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far afield and can be treated here only briefly: so-called direct evi-
dence of constitutional meaning, consisting of statements of informed
individuals made during the relevant events, is not really as direct as is
commonly thought. If one is looking for the actual intentions or un-
derstandings-the mental states-of persons who lived during the
founding era, their recorded statements are good (even if not conclu-
sive) evidence of those intentions. But we do not regard the search
for original meaning as a search for historically concrete understand-
ings. Instead, we conceive of the inquiry in hypothetical terms: What
would a fully-informed public audience, in possession of all relevant
information about the Constitution and the world around it, have un-
derstood the Constitution to mean? Although evidence of actual
mental states is admissible and relevant to prove constitutional mean-
ing in this sense-after all, one cannot really know what a hypotheti-
cal audience would'have thought at a particular time without knowing
something about what real audiences actually thought-it is not con-
clusive and often is not even the best available evidence. Actual.
mental states may not reflect actual meaning if people did not fully
underistand certain important features of the Constitution or the
world. That is why arguments from text, structure, and general back-
ground understandings are, in general, more powerful than argu-
ments from historical authority-not because of any problems of
discovering, reconciling, and aggregating intentions (though these
are real problems), but because of the nature of original meaning. 91
At the substantive level, even if one is interested in historical com-
mentary on the legal status of the Constitution in 1788, one is likely to
be disappointed. The simple fact is that people were not thinking
much about the legal effect of New Hampshire's ratification in the
summer of 1788. Attention was focused on the concrete problems of
putting together a functioning union. New Hampshire was a minor
player in this drama. The lead actors were Virginia and New York,
with North Carolina playing a supporting role.92 To put it bluntly, no
one much cared if there was a new federal union of nine states if Vir-
ginia and New York did not sign on. A fairly typical comment-per-
haps especially pointed for its objectivity-came from the French
91 Of course, to explain, much less defend, this understanding of original mean-
ing would require a book. One of us is planning such a book, though it will not be
forthcoming any time soon. For some very preliminary thoughts on the meaning and
mechanics of originalism, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash,
77w President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550-59 (1994); Mark D.
Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEo. L.J. 569 (1998);
Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes... and Constitutions, 85 GEo. L.J. 1823 (1997).
92 Rhode Island was also in the cast, but only as a bit player.
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Minister Plenipotentiary, who upon learning of New Hampshire's rati-
fication wrote that "without Virginia and Newyork the new Govern-
ment will exist more in name than in fact."93 Ezra Stiles said virtually
the same thing in his diary: "Adoption of the new foederal Constitu-
tion by the State of New Hampshire .... So now the new Constitution
is ratified, ie, literally-but if N York, Virga. & No Caro should not
accede, it will yet be some time before the Ratification may be consid-
ered as completely established. '94 This was no doubt the general sen-
timent: even if, in some legalistic sense, the Constitution was now
ratified as law, the union would be of little practical use without the
remaining big states. The legal effectiveness of the Constitution sim-
ply was not the major issue of the day.95 That role was filled by the
attempt to get New York and Virginia on board. To the extent that
people talked about the New Hampshire ratification, it was largely in
the context of its potential effect on the conventions in other states.
As another French observer astutely put it, "[New Hampshire's] Ratifi-
cation is enough for the Establishment of the new Constitution ....
But it is believed that Congress, before joining together the nine
States in the new Confederation, is waiting until Virginia, North Caro-
lina and New-York, whose conventions are now assembled, have
adopted or rejected the proposed Constitution."96 Even after Virginia
joined the union, George Washington was still focused on the practi-
cal need to bring the other states into the fold.97
93 Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte do Montmorin (June 25, 1788), re-
printed in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 189,
192 (John P. Kaminski & GaspareJ. Saladino eds., 1995) (original spelling retained)
[hereinafter Kaminski & Saladino].
94 Ezra Stiles Diary, June 25, 1788, in Kaminski & Saladino, supra note 93, at 194
(original spelling retained).
95 This is reflected in the ambivalence of historians concerning the significance
of New Hampshire's ratification. See HERBERT APTHEKER, EARLY-YEARS OF THE REPUB-
LIC 102 (1976) ("New Hampshire ratified on June 21, 1788 and since she was the
ninth State to do so, her action in a formal sense satisfied the requirements for ratifica-
tion as established by the Philadelphia convention .... ) (emphasis added); ANDREW
C. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 202 (1935) ("The
New Hampshire convention... adopted the Constitution,June 21, 1788. But the all-
important states of New York and Virginia were still in doubt."); RICHARD B. MomS,
THE FORGING OF THE UNION 1781-1789, at 312 (1987) ("Although New Hampshire,
the ninth state, ratified the Constitution four days ahead of Virginia, thus putting the
charter into effect, a key battle remained to be waged to attach New York to the Union.
Without New York the nation would remain split asunder.") (emphasis added).
96 Letter from Phillipe Andre Joseph de Letombe to Comte de la Luzerne (June
26, 1788), in Kaminski & Saladino, supra note 93, at 194, 194-95.
97 See Letter from George Washington to Charles Coteworth Pinckney (June 28,
1788), in Kaminski & Saladino, supra note 93, at 207, 207.
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In short, the purely legal question that we address here, and that
Chief Justice Marshall faced in Owings v. Speed, was not a question that
people were asking, much less answering, in the summer of 1788.98
Their attention was directed to the more immediately practical
problems of putting together a nation. A legal union was not necessa-
rily a functioning union. Nine states may have been enough to estab-
lish the Constitution, but if New York and Virginia were not among
them, they were not enough to fulfill the objectives of unification.
The founding generation can be forgiven for not paying atten-
tion to the legal niceties of the effect of ratification. We now have the
luxury of time and hindsight. So did Chief Justice Marshall, which
makes his decision in Owings all the less excusable.
D. If One Government Was Not Bad Enough...
Chief Justice Marshall's argument in Owings boils down to the
single statement that the constitutional government and the govern-
ment under the Articles of Confederation "could not be understood
to exist at the same time."99 Because the government under the Arti-
cles continued to exist after the decisive ninth ratification-how else
could it verify the ratifications and fix dates for the session of the new
98 If one must have an obligatory contemporaneous document, the most relevant
discussion that we have found is in two letters from Tenche Coxe and Nalbo Frazier to
some merchants in Barbados. On July 10, 1788, Coxe and Frazier wrote that "the
affairs of this Country are now placed upon a safe & promising footing by the Adop-
tion of the New Constitution[.] []t is binding on the ten States that have adopted...."
Letter from Tenche Coxe & Nalbo Frazier to James O'Neal (July 10, 1788), in Kamin-
ski & Saladino, supra note 93, at 255 (emphasis added). On July 11, they wrote:
[T]he various foreign Gentlemen connected in the American Trade will
have great safety hereafter in their Connexions with this County from the
final Adoption & ratification of the new form of Government. No papers ten-
ders & no law impairing or staying the execution of Contracts can hereafter take
place, and our State courts will not have to determine between foreigners &
us; but an impartial federal Court ....
Letter from Tenche Coxe & Nalbo Frazier to Stephen Blackett (July 11, 1788), in
Kaminski & Saladino, supra note 93, at 255-56 (emphasis added). Taken out of con-
text, the emphasized portions could be taken to suggest that the authors understood
the Constitution's prohibitions on states to be immediately effective. But the subse-
quent reference to federal courts, which clearly could not operate until the machin-
ery of the new government was in place, indicates that authors were not focusing on
the possible differential effects of various constitutional provisions. Thus, aside from
any questions about how much weight to attach to private commercial correspon-
dence-even from so notable a figure as Tenche Coxe-there is no indication that
anyone was thinking directly about the effective date of the Article I, Section 10
prohibitions on states.
99 Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422 (1820).
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Congress and for the selection of presidential electors?-and indeed
continued to exist "potentially until . . . the day preceding that on
which the members of the new Congress were directed to assem-
ble," 100 the new constitutional government could not possibly be said
to exist until the new Congress met.
Taken at face value, this is a very peculiar position. The new gov-
ernment clearly could not exercise legislative, executive, or judicial
authority until it had legislative, executive, and judicial personnel ca-
pable of carrying those powers into effect. Had the Constitution been
nothing but the structural blueprint for a new set of federal institu-
tions, Marshall's point might have some force. But the Constitution
was obviously more than that. It was also a denial of state power in
certain important respects. There is nothing illogical about the simul-
taneous existence of the governmental institutions under the Articles
and the prohibitions on state action contained in the Constitution.10
And that, as we have seen, is precisely what the best understanding of
the Constitution's effectiveness requires. Marshall's all-or-nothing
view of constitutional effectiveness is simply unwarranted.
It is hard to resist another response to Marshall as well. The idea
that there is something logically impossible about two governments
existing simultaneously over the same territory is, to say the least,
strange coming from a Federalistjudge. Any federal system that does
not absolutely separate the realms of authority of the national and
local governments presents this picture of overlapping sovereigns. Of
course, any such regime requires conflict-of-laws norms to resolve ju-
risdictional disputes, but the idea that you cannot have two govern-
ments that both have some measure of authority over a territory is just
silly. Moreover, this notion of overlapping jurisdiction is familiar from
international law. In United States v. Rice,'0 2 the Court (with ChiefJus-
tice Marshall on board) explained the occupancy of foreign territory
during wartime gives the occupying nation a right to administer the
territory, but does not make the occupied territory a formal part of
the administering nation.'03 The scheme of private rights that pre-
existed the occupation continues until changed in accordance with
appropriate domestic and international norms. And although the
public institutions of governance of the occupied nations are immedi-
ately displaced upon occupation, those institutions do not disappear.
100 Id.
101 Indeed, many of the Constitution's prohibitions on state action were foreshad-
owed by similar prohibitions in the Articles of Confederation.
102 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
103 See id. at 253-55.
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If the occupying nation leaves without permanently acquiring the ter-
ritory through cession, the original sovereign does not need to re-cre-
ate all of its prior institutions of government; they simply laid dormant
until the end of the occupation. In a very real sense, wartime occupa-
tion of territory involves overlapping governments.
It is doubtful that Marshall really meant something as silly as the
proposition that there cannot ever be overlapping governments. Per-
haps he had in mind something more functional: in the absence of
the institutional machinery of the new constitutional government,
who would enforce the "self-executing" prohibitions, such as the Con-
tracts Clause? Until federal judges were appointed, there were no fed-
eral courts. Until a Congress and President were selected, there could
be no federal enforcement mechanism for any constitutional provi-
sions. If, as modern positivists will doubtless insist, there cannot be
any legal rights without corresponding remedies, 04 what can it mean
to say that the Constitution created legal rights and obligations in the
summer of 1788?
A full treatment of the issues lurking behind this seemingly sim-
ple objection would require a separate article, but a few remarks will
be sufficient for our purposes here. The simplest answer is that an
enforcement mechanism for constitutional violations was indeed in
place in 1788. Article VI of the Constitution provides that "[t]his Con-
stitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.' u0 5 State courts, as
courts of general jurisdiction, were therefore bound to apply federal
constitutional rules in cases to which they apply as soon as the Consti-
tution became effective. It is true that federal courts would not sit in
superintendence of state decisions until sometime in 1789, but even
after the federal personnel were in place, state courts were expected
to be the front-line defense against many constitutional violations, in-
cluding violations by their own states. 10 6 Thus, the necessary govern-
104 See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 541, 579 (2000) ("As a central tenet
of his jurisprudence, Llewellyn believed that people only had legal rights to the extent
that the law provided them remedies.").
105 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cI. 2.
106 That is not to say that the founding generation unanimously expected state
courts to entertain all possible cases arising under the Constitution. See Michael G.
Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L.
Rxv. 39, 52-78. But to the extent that there were thought to be "enclaves" of exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction, claims under the Contracts Clause were unlikely candidates.
See id. at 78-105 (discussing the types of cases for which the arguments for exclusive
federal jurisdiction were most prominent).
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mental apparatus to enforce the Constitution was in place on June 21,
1788.
Even if one will settle for nothing but a federal enforcement
mechanism, it is still meaningful to say that the Constitution became
law when it was ratified. It was evident in 1788 that the new govern-
ment would be up and running in relatively short order. A potential
plaintiff in 1788 had only to wait for the appropriate machinery of
federal governance to be in place in order to raise constitutional
claims. There is nothing absurd about a scheme in which rights are
established at one time and remedies are provided at another. Justice
delayed is not-or at least is not always-justice denied; it is justice
delayed. The delay may be inconvenient, hurtful, and occasionally fa-
tal, but conceptually one can hold fast to the notion that rights must
have remedies, and even to the notion that federal rights must have
federal remedies, and still conclude that the Constitution became law
in 1788.
Moreover, the idea that legal rights could not exist without an
external enforcement mechanism is hard to square .with the founding-
era acceptance of international law. The Constitution, of course, ex-
pressly recognizes the "law of nations"10 7 as a distinct legal category,
and founding-era documents and early cases are filled with references
to the law of nations as a robust source of authority.108 Indeed, in
1819, Congress went so far as to criminalize "piracy, as defined by the
law of nations."10 9 There was (and is) obviously no legal enforcement
mechanism external to the United States whose function was to en-
force the law of nations. That did not prevent eighteenth-century
thinkers from viewing it as law. Nor did the (short-term) absence of
federal enforcement machinery prevent the federal Constitution from
having the status of law prior to the spring of 1789.
Underlying this concern about rights and remedies is the slippery
concept of sovereignty. Who was the sovereign in the United States on
June 21, 1788? To what extent was that sovereign's power defined by
the Constitution? Can one speak of a document as "sovereign," or can
that term be applied only to a concrete set of human institutions?
These are questions for another day. For now, it is enough to note
that the concept of sovereignty was undergoing a revolution in eight-
107 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Congress power "[it o define and pun-
ish... Offences [sic] against the Law of Nations").
108 See StewartJay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND.
L. REv. 819, 820 (1989).
109 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14. The statute was upheld
(over a vigorous dissent) as a constitutional exercise of the power to "define" the
offense of piracy. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820).
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eenth-century America that may dwarf the role of the written Consti-
tution as a distinctively American contribution to political theory. If
sovereignty is not a single brute fact, but is instead a complex interplay
among sometimes complementary and sometimes competing human
institutions, then that understanding harmonizes well with the notion
of a constitution that is, at a particular moment in time, partially effec-
tive and partially ineffective. The legal status-or, rather, the legal
statuses-of the Constitution in the summer of 1788 may thus provide
insight into some very deep questions of governance that are at the
heart of the American revolutionary political experience.
II. THis LAND Is WHOSE LAND?
Ill-defined speculations about deep political theory aside, why
would anyone today care about such arcane matters as the "true" ef-
fective date of the Constitution? The fate of a good portion of upstate
New York, however, turned on the question a mere two decades ago,
and the Supreme Court's wrong answer in 1820 had major conse-
quences. One suspects that a correct understanding of the Constitu-
tion's effective date would not-and perhaps should not-have
altered the outcome in that case, but we will never know.
In the 1780s, the Oneida Indian Nation was in possession of more
than five million acres of land in central NewYork State." 0 The State
wanted the land. On June 23, 1785, the Oneidas were induced-al-
legedly by threats from the state Governor to refuse to protect their
lands from trespasses-to sign a treaty selling 300,000 acres of their
territory to the State."' On September 22, 1788, NewYork procured
another treaty with the Oneidas-this time allegedly by fraud and mis-
representation-for the remaining lands. 112
Two hundred years later, the Oneidas sued to recover their prop-
erty.113 The primary substantive issue in the case involved whether the
Articles of Confederation disabled the states from entering into trea-
ties with Indians. 1 4 After considerable effort, the federal courts con-
110 Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 520 F. Supp. 1278, 1286 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
111 Id. at 1287.
112 Some of the relevant court opinions provide a fuller statement of the facts. See
Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1148-49 (2d Cir. 1988); Oneida
Indian Nation, 520 F. Supp. at 1286-88.
113 State statutes of limitations for the recovery of real property do not apply to
claims by Indian tribes. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070,
1083-84 (2d Cir. 1982).
114 The case also presented a host of issues concerning jurisdiction, justiciability,
and remedies that are not relevant here. For a discussion of some of the remedial
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cluded that the Articles did not invalidate the transactions.115 We
accept that conclusion here without examining it. Our concern is
with a different argument that received almost no attention.
The Treaty of Fort Schuyler, which transferred the vast bulk of
the land in question to the State of New York, was signed on Septem-
ber 22, 1788.116 New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the
federal Constitution on June 21, 1788. NewYork added its ratification
on July 26, 1788. Thus, when the Treaty of Fort Schuyler was signed,
New York was officially part of the new federal union.
The Constitution prescribes that "[n] o State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation."' " 7 The President and Senate
have the exclusive power to make treaties under the Constitution. I" 8
Although the Articles of Confederation also restricted the power of
states to enter into treaties, 1 9 those restrictions were substantially
more limited than those provided in the federal Constitution. 20 It
was taken for granted in the Oneida litigation that federal power to
enter into treaties with Indians was plenary and exclusive under the
issues, see generallyJoshua N. Lief, Note, The Oneida Land Claims: Equity and Ejectment,
39 SYRAcUSE L. REV. 825 (1988).
115 It took four decisions to finalize that conclusion: the original district court de-
cision rejecting the claims, see Oneida Indian Nation, 520 F. Supp. 1278; a court of
appeals decision remanding for further consideration, see Oneida Indian Nation, 691
F.2d 1070; a second district court decision reaffirming the original disposition, see
Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 649 F. Supp. 420 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); and the final
affirmance by the Second Circuit, see Oneida Indian Nation, 860 F.2d 1145.
116 See Oneida Indian Nation, 860 F.2d at 1149.
117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
118 See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Congress has power to "regulate Commerce ... with
the Indian Tribes." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Whether that power is also exclusive is an-
other story.
119 See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION, art. VI (1) ("No State without the consent of the
United States in Congress assembled, shall... enter into any conference, agreement,
alliance or treaty with any king, prince or foreign state.").
120 The language of Article I, Section 10 is more categorical than the language in
Article VI of the Articles of Confederation: it is a flat prohibition on state treaties,
rather than a requirement of congressional consent, and it contains no specific men-
tion of treaties with "any king, prince or foreign state," which language could conceiv-
ably exclude treaties with Indian nations or tribes. Moreover, the Indian Commerce
Clause of Article I, see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power "[t]o regu-
late Commerce... with the Indian Tribes"), is not subject to the substantial reserva-
tion of state authority contained in the analogous grant in the Articles of
Confederation. See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX(4) (giving the Confederation
Congress "sole and exclusive right and power of... regulating the trade and manag-
ing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any States, provided that the legislative
right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violation").
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Constitution.1 2 1 Thus, assuming that the constitutional term "Treaty"
includes agreements with Indian tribes, 122 and assuming that the Con-
stitution was in effect when the Treaty of Fort Schuyler was signed, it
would appear that New York had no power to enter into the treaty in
1788.
The Oneidas advanced this argument in 1981, and it was casually
dismissed by the District Court on the strength of Owings v. Speed:
Crucial to the plaintiffs' argument is their assertion that the Consti-
tution was in effect on September 22, 1788, the date on Which the
Treaty was concluded. The plaintiffs contend that the Constitution
became effective after ratification by the ninth State on June 21,
1788, with New York ratifying in July of 1788.
However, the Supreme Court long ago concluded otherwise in a
case in which the issue was Whether the provisions of the Constitu-
tion applied to acts of state legislatures in 1788 ....
The Court in Owings ruled that the Constitution did not become
operative until the first Wednesday in March of 1789, the date set by
resolution of the old government. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims
under the Constitution must fail. 123
121 See Oneida Indian Nation, 860 F.2d at 1159-60.
122 For an argument that agreements with Indians might not be treaties in the full
constitutional sense, see Karen D. Kendrick-Hands, Note, State Sovereignty and Indian
Land Claims: The Validity of New York's Treaties Prior to the Nonintercourse Act of 1790, 31
SyACUSE. L. REv. 797, 816-19, 835-39 (1980). The claim is substantial: it has consid-
erable support in founding-era materials and may be the only view that makes sense
of the doctrine of discovery, as it applies to title descended from European conquests
in North America. Nonetheless, it is probably wrong. Congress did not require In-
dian land sales to take place through treaties "entered into pursuant to the constitu-
tion" until the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793. See Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1793, ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329, 330. The original 1790 version of the
Intercourse Act required merely that such sales "be made and duly executed at some
public treaty, held under the authority of the United States." Indian Trade and Inter-
course Act of 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (emphasis added). The word "at"
indicates that the term "treaty" in the 1790 act merely meant a public meeting of
some kind-a usage that was not uncommon in the eighteenth century. SeeKendrick-
Hands, supra at 816-17 & n.153. If, however, Indian treaties were not treaties in the
constitutional sense, then Congress had no authority in 1793 to require their use-as
it has done for the past 200 years. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994) ("No purchase, grant,
lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian
nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be
made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution."). Congress
cannot make something a constitutional "treaty" if it doesn't already fit the
description.
123 Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 520 F. Supp. 1278, 1323 (N:D.N.Y. 1981).
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The issue does not appear in any subsequent decision involving the
Oneidas' claims; the plaintiffs presumably (and quite reasonably)
abandoned it once the court invoked Owings.
The clause prohibiting the states-from entering into treaties, how-
ever, surely went into effect upon ratification of the Constitution. The
clause does not require any federal legislative or executive action for
its implementation; it is a straightforward denial of state power.1 24 Ac-
cordingly, as of June 21, 1788, no state that ratified the Constitution
could enter into a treaty. When New York ratified the Constitution on
July 26, 1788, it thereby surrendered its power to make treaties. Even
if, as the federal courts held in the Oneida litigation, the Articles of
Confederation did not disable the states from purchasing land from
Indians through treaties, those states that ratified the Constitution
bound themselves to the document's prohibitions, including the pro-
hibition on treaties. As far as the ratifying states were concerned, the
government under the Articles had the exclusive right to enter into
treaties with Indians until the new federal government had a function-
ing President and Senate (and perhaps a functioning House of Repre-
sentatives to the extent that treaties were not sef-executing).1 25
Accordingly, the Treaty of Fort Schuyler was palpably illegal.
Perhaps concerns about justiciability or remedies would, and
should, have ultimately prevented the Oneidas from reclaiming their
124 The district court, echoing the thoughts of Ms. Kendrick-Hands, see Kendrick-
Hands, supra note 122, at 836-37, suggested that federal legislation was necessary in
order to deprive the states of their right to acquire title to Indian lands. See Oneida
Indian Nation, 520 F. Supp. at 1323 n.45. This makes sense, however, only if agree-
ments with Indians are not "treaties" in the constitutional sense. The prohibition on
state treaties is part of a single clause that contains most of the original Constitution's
denials of state power. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, ci. 1.
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Let-
ters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
Id. The Treaty or Alliance Clause no more requires federal legislative implementa-
tion than does the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Contracts Clause, or the Titles of
Nobility Clause. If the state can acquire Indian title through some means other than
a treaty, that is a different matter. But there is little to be said for the view that the
Treaty or Alliance Clause is not self-executing.
125 For a spirited debate over the extent to which treaties are self-executing under
the Constitution, see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land", 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2099
(1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM..L. REV. 2154, 2155
(1999); Yoo, Globalism, supra note 34, at 1960-61; Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking,
supra note 34, at 2218-19.
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land. Perhaps there may even have been a way for New York validly to
have purchased the land through some mechanism other than a
treaty. We have no considered opinion on these subjects. But surely
the Oneidas' arguments deserved more consideration than Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's ancient blunder permitted.
III. THE MARSHALL PLAN
John Marshall was a smart man. He seldom acted in a major way
without an agenda and without a keen eye for consequences. How
could he make such an obvious mistake in Owings about something as
basic as the effective date of the Constitution?
It is possible, of course, that neither he nor anyone else thought
of Owings as a major case. Perhaps the decision was tossed off hur-
riedly (it certainly reads as though it was hastily written), and no one
gave the matter any serious thought. One should at least entertain
the idea, however, that Marshall knew exactly what he was doing.
What would have happened (other than the restoration of Ow-
ings's possession of his land) had Marshall ruled in favor of Owings?
By March 4, 1789, everyone had had a chance to get used to the idea
of the new federal government. Elections had been held, and the
changing of the guard from the Articles to the Constitution was com-
plete. State legislatures, in particular, were certainly aware by that
time that the Article I, Section 10 prohibitions needed to be obeyed.
Was that really true before that date? If the Constitution became ef-
fective for nine states as ofJune'21, 1788 (and as of the date of their
ratifications for Virginia and New York), then the Article I, Section 10
prohibitions were legal norms as of that date. They thus bound states
that may not even have been aware of the decisive ninth ratification
for some time. And as evidenced by the Virginia statute in Owings,
even after ratification states were not necessarily acting under the im-
pression that they were bound by the Constitution's restrictions.126 It
is possible that many land. titles beyond Owings's could be called into
question by a holding that the Contracts Clause was in effect from the
moment of ratification. The disruptive consequences of a judgment
for Owings might be significant.
126 Is that not strong evidence of a public understanding that the Constitution was
not, in any sense, effective until (at least) March 4, 1789? It is perhaps evidence, but
not strong evidence. Everyone treated the selection provisions for the staffing of the
new government as being effective from the loment of ratification. There is no good
distinction between those provisions and the Article I, Section 10 prohibitions. If
Virginia legislators thought othervise, that was (or should have been) their
misfortune.
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More to the point, the Constitution also declares that " [n] o State
shall... emit Bills of Credit [or] make any Thing but gold and silver
Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts. 1 27 Were all of the ratifying states
in compliance with these provisions from June 21, 1788 on? The
point is not whether they were or were not. We do not know.
Neither, we suspect, did John Marshall in 1820. But if states were in
fact (so Marshall could at least imagine) issuing paper money in vari-
ous forms between the summer of 1788 and the spring of 1789, what
would be the consequences in 1820 of reaching back thirty years to
undo at least some of those transactions? Perhaps most of those
claims would be time-barred. Perhaps the effect of holding the Con-
stitution to be in effect from ratification would be minimal. Perhaps
there were in fact no transactions to undo. But why (from Marshall's
perspective) risk it when a simple resolution, with a clearly drawn line,
is readily at hand? And it is all the more attractive because the rule
works in favor of state legislation. Just one year after McCulloch v. Ma-
ryland,128 did it really make sense to drop another potential bomb on
the states, with hard-to-foresee consequences?
We have no way to know whether any of this speculation even
remotely rings true. But if it is at all close to the mark, there is an
interesting convergence between Owings and the Oneida cases. The
strict question of the legal rights of the Oneida Nation clearly took a
back seat to more practical problems of remedies: What would hap-
pen if five million acres of land in New York suddenly had to change
hands after 200 years? No one, I trust, seriously expected the federal
courts to hand over New York to the Oneida Nation, no matter how
compelling their claims might be in terms of law and justice-just as
Chief Justice Marshall, three years after Owings, was not about to de-
clare the European occupation of North America to have been ille-
gal.129 Judges can practice legal nullification just as effectively as can
juries. We have elsewhere discussed at length another context in
which the prospect of unsettling existing legal relations induced the
Supreme Court (and the United States executive department) to
adopt legal positions of dazzling absurdity.130 We do not mean to en-
dorse that practice. Quite to the contrary, we think it the job of schol-
ars, or at least our job, to pursue knowledge as objectively and
dispassionately as possible. What others do with that knowledge is be-
yond our control.
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
128 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
129 SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
130 See generally Lawson & Seidman, supra note 55.
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The Constitution became law over a period of time beginning on
June 21, 1788. That conclusion may be inconvenient in some respects
(not the least of which is the awkwardness of encyclopedia entries on
the effective date of the Constitution), but it is right.
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